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ABSTRACT 
As a result of South Africa's democracy and introduction of new policies and laws in 
1994, a new approach to water resource management has been developed. This new 
approach includes the requirement to establish local level water management 
institutions which will eventually become self sustainable. These institutions are 
called water user associations (WUAs). The research uses two case study WUAs in 
former homeland areas of the Eastern Cape. They are assessed and evaluated against a 
set of criteria, taken from Shackleton (1998), that are conducive to successful local 
level management. The criteria include characteristics on the nature of the water 
resource, the nature of the water resource users, institutional issues, the nature of rules 
and regulations, economic issues and policy issues. The research found that the two 
case study WUAs lacked most of the characteristics that are conducive to successful 
10calleve1 management. The WUA establishment process was dominated by the state. 
Stakeholder involvement was weak and failed to sufficiently recognize the traditional 
authorities. The facilitation of the establishment process was not effective due to a 
lack of state resources. A more intense and inclusive process driven approach towards 
establishing WUAs is required. This could tend the characteristics of a WUA toward 
becoming more conducive to successful local level management. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to study 
Understanding collective action within community based natural resource 
management (CBNRM) is of global importance as pressures on communal land and 
our pool of natural resources such as water are ever mounting (Shackleton, 1998). 
These pressures result in a weakening of local institutions and the management 
systems for common pool resources. This leads to a deterioration of resources and 
hardships for resource reliable communities, especially the poorest (Shackleton, 
1998). South Africa is no exception as management systems over its land held under 
communal tenure, some 15 million hectares, are facing increasing pressures as a result 
of resource exploitation from outside traders, weakening traditional systems, a 
changing socio-political environment, population increases, migration and the already 
degraded land in large areas. Communal land predominantly occurs in the former 
homeland areas I in the Eastern Cape but land under group ownership in South Africa 
as a whole is increasing as the land redistribution and restitution process continues to 
aid community groups in attaining land tenure. In many cases, the state is devolving 
power to manage land and resources, including water, back to local communities 
therefore further increasing the pool of resources held under community ownership 
and management (Shackleton et al2002). However water resources are directly linked 
to land tenure therefore land redistribution policies also have significant implications 
regarding access to water and the management thereof. 
Initially efforts to implement the land reform policy in South Africa focused on the 
process of attaining land and the legal processes required in securing ownership 
(Shackleton, 1998). Issues arose as not much consideration was given to the policy 
and implementation regarding the implications of acquiring land under group 
ownership and how the natural resources, such as water, would be used and managed 
(Shackleton, 1998). In the last decade, there has been much advancement, both in 
theory and in practice, towards strengthening local institutions in the management of 
resources. 
As a result of the new policies and laws since South Africa's independence in 1994, 
new water resource management systems were introduced. The National Water Act 
(NWA) required a National Water Resource Strategy to be developed. This strategy 
introduced a three tiered management system reaching from national government, to 
regional level management, and down to local level management. A key component 
of this strategy aims to establish local level water management institutions that are 
self sustainable. However, South Africa is extremely diverse and requires different 
approaches to managing resources to suit site specific locations, especially in former 
homeland areas where systems of traditional governance over natural resources still 
exist. In these areas the state strategy needs to integrate traditional governance 
systems (DW AF 2004a). 
1 Homeland areas were "independent" black states created by the apartheid government for the 
resettlement of black people relocated from white areas. In 1994 when the apartheid system was 
abolished, these areas were re-incorporated into South Africa. Large portions of land in these areas are 
still considered to be tribal land. 
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The area under communal ownership and community management is ever increasing 
in South Africa, but many challenges lay ahead (Shackleton et al 2002). This paper 
therefore focuses on requirements for successful collective local level management of 
water as a natural resource. Two case studies are examined where water user 
association (WUA) institutions have been established to manage water resources. 
These case studies are located in a rural area of the Eastern Cape and have been set up 
in response to the National Water Resource Strategy (NWRS) that requires devolving 
a certain level of power to the local level for the management of water resources. 
1.2 Aims 
The overall objective of this research is to find ways to improve local level water 
resource management within the South African context by identifying conditions, in 
the literature, conducive to natural resource management and comparing them to 
conditions in two existing local level water institutions in the Eastern Cape. Specific 
aims of the research are thus: 
1. To provide an overview of South Africa's new approach to water resource 
management, 
2. To identify the conditions conducive to successful local level collective action 
for the management of natural resources, 
3. In relation to Shackleton's criteria, (1998), assess whether these criteria are in 
place with respect to two WUAs in the Eastern Cape, and 
4. To identify opportunities and challenges associated with establishing WUAs in 
the Eastern Cape. 
1.3 Methodology 
This research requires an understanding of the current policy and legal framework 
governing water resource management in South Africa as well as an understanding of 
the theoretical underpinnings of CBNRM. Consequently a literature review on these 
topics was carried out to provide a base from which the research could proceed. 
Primary data was gathered through field investigations including interviews and 
workshops with stakeholders involved in two WUAs in the Eastern Cape. The 
purpose of the fieldwork was to enhance understanding of the process involved in 
establishing WUAs and also understanding WUAs functions. The study focused on 
two WUAs in the rural areas of the Eastern Cape namely Misikhanye and eDikeni 
(see figures 2 and 3). The fieldwork consisted of four trips comprising about 20 days 
in total in the study area. Information was gathered using a number of methods. A 
stakeholder analysis was carried out to identify institutions or stakeholders that were 
involved or interested in the establishment and operation of WUAs. Following this 
analysis, a number of semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders were then 
conducted covering state institutions, private organisations, NGGs, traditional leaders 
and local villagers. Transect walks were also undertaken with community 
representatives to get a better idea of day to day activities and to better understand the 
role that water plays in the lives of these communities. Finally two participatory 
workshops were held in each WUA area to obtain local perspectives on the processes 
involved in establishing WUAs, as well as the functions and purposes of WUAs and 
communication flows. 
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1.4 Limitations to study 
Time in the field was limited due to budget and time constraints restricting the depth 
of infonnation that could be gathered. However, in this time, the researcher obtained 
useful infonnation and insights on institutional arrangements regarding water 
management, issues and challenges facing the implementation of WUAs, cultural and 
traditional practices that may influence new water management institutions, and local 
conditions. The field research including meetings, interviews, workshops and field 
observations were carried out in the Eastern Cape during the first six months of 2007. 
Working in the rural areas of the Eastern Cape posed various logistical difficulties 
including the arrangements of meetings and workshops. Infonnation on group 
meetings in these rural areas was not always conveyed to all the required stakeholders 
and thus certain meetings were poorly attended. 
1.5 Structure of the paper 
This first section of the paper has provided the background and aims of the project. 
Following this, the policy and legislative framework relevant to water resource 
management in SA is presented and an overview of South Africa's new approach to 
water resource management is provided. Chapter three provides a conceptual 
framework for the paper based on common pool theory after which a table of 
favourable criteria for successful collective action at a community level is provided. 
The paper then moves on to describe the characteristics of the two case study 
locations. The next chapter uses the findings gathered from the two case studies to 
assess how the WUAs perform against the identified criteria. Before concluding the 
strengths and weaknesses of the WUAs as local level water management institutions 
and what their opportunities and challenges are likely to be, are discussed. 
2. SOUTH AFRICA'S NEW APPROACH TO WRM 
The following chapter aims to contextualise WUAs within South Africa's new water 
policy. A brief overview of South Africa's new approach to water resource 
management, related policies, new concepts and water management institutions will 
be provided. WUAs also fonn part of a growing global trend towards CBNRM 
initiatives therefore policies and laws relating to CBNRM will also be covered. 
2.1 The new approach to water resource management 
The old system of water management in South Africa was characterised by centralised 
control, inefficiency and inequity (DW AF, 2004a). These issues were tackled and 
changed as the democratic South Africa adopted a new approach to water resource 
management. This new approach encapsulates international thinking on integrated 
water resource management (IWRM). The principles upon which this new approach is 
based are: 
• A movement towards demand management, 
• Decentralisation of water management with more stakeholder participation, 
• An integrated approach to water, ecologically, economically and socially, 
• Recognition and protection of water resources, 
• Recognition of rights to water, and 
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• Increased social equity 1n access to water and VOIce 1n water related 
institutions. 
(Ferguson and Mulwafu, 2004) 
IWRM is defined as "The coordination of development and management of water and 
land and related resources to maximize resultant economic and social welfare in an 
equitable manner without compromising sustainability of vital ecosystems" (lRC, 
2006). Post-apartheid South Africa embraces this concept as it looks to correct 
imbalances of the past and provide opportunity for people to improve their 
livelihoods. South Africa has adopted a catchment management approach to 
integrated water resource management as outlined in the National Water Act (NWA). 
IWRM is highlighted in the preamble to the NW A, as 'The need for the integrated 
management of all aspects of water resources and, where appropriate, the delegation 
of management functions to regional or catchment level so as to enable everyone to 
participate'. IWRM has "three pillars" of implementation: moving towards an 
enabling environment of appropriate policies, strategies and legislation for sustainable 
water resources development and management; putting in place the institutional 
framework through which the policies, strategies and legislation can be implemented; 
and setting up the management instruments required by these institutions to do their 
job (J0nch-Clausen, 2004). 
2.2 Policy and legislation relevant to IWRM in South Africa 
The constitution lays down the foundation upon which other laws including water law 
and policy are formed. The Constitution emphasises the imperative to " ... heal the 
divisions of the past. .. " and to " ... improve the quality of life of all citizens" (RSA, 
1996). The National Environmental Management Act no. 107 of 1998 (NEMA) 
provides a set of framework principles that inform decision making on issues related 
to the environment and to ensure that all activities that have a detrimental effect on the 
environment are minimised while maximising opportunities for sustainable 
development. NEMA calls for co-operative governance in South Africa and 
encourages communication and co-ordination across all tiers of government. The 
National Water Act (NWA) provides a framework for water law refonn processes and 
places the Department of Water Affairs and Foresty (OWAF) as the public trustee 
over all of South Africa's water resources. The NW A clearly defines that the country 
should be divided into demarcated water management areas. Catchment management 
agencies (CMA) must be established to govern these management areas and local 
level water management institutions must also be put in place. These local level 
institutions include the Water User Associations (WUA) which enable communities to 
pool resources together to carry out activities of common interest more effectively for 
their mutual benefit (OWAF, 2004a). The structure of water management institutions 
is explained in more detail in the next section, 2.3. 
The NW A (1998) also stipulates that a reserve must be determined before any water 
can be allocated for use outside basic need. The reserve is calculated by measuring the 
mean annual runoff (MAR) and subtracting the sum of a specified ecological reserve 
and a basic human needs requirement. The ecological reserve refers to the water 
required to protect the aquatic ecosystem of the water reserve. The basic need 
component is made up of the essentials for basic survival which are for drinking, food 
preparation, and personal hygiene (RSA, 1998). 
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The national water resource strategy (NWRS) is the main mechanism through which 
requirements in the NW A are carried out. The NWRS sets out a plan to manage water 
resources in a manner which promotes equity, sustainability, and efficiency, and in 
particular to improve the state of inequity, poverty, and deprivation in South Africa 
(OWAF, 2004a). Important themes within this strategy include water conservation 
and water demand management, the protection of water resources, water use and 
licensing, and a pricing strategy. Part 5 of the NWRS outlines the strategy for 
establishing water management institutions such as the CMA and WUA which is 
explained in further detail in the following section. 
2.3 Water management institutions 
Water resources and water supply in South Africa fall under the jurisdiction of 
DWAF. Two different water policy objectives exist under OWAF. First and foremost 
is to supply water as a basic need for survival, which is under the jurisdiction of 
district municipalities who are the Water Service Authorities. Either local 
municipalities or water boards are appointed to be the Water Service Providers 
(WSPs). However, some smaller local municipalities have not been able to deliver as 
WSPs and district municipality then assumes control over these (OWAF, 2004b). The 
second objective is to provide water beyond basic needs and aims to provide water for 
enterprise development, especially in poor rural areas that have been previously 
disadvantaged. The NWRS is created in part to fulfil this second objective through 
three tiers of water management institutions. 
In terms of the NWRS, the country has been divided into 19 Water Management 
Areas (WMAs) which are to be regulated by Catchment Management Agencies 
(CMAs), a new regional institution specified in the NW A. Since these WMAs are 
based on hydrological boundaries, they can cut across the administrative boundaries 
of provinces and districts. Three tiers (see figure 1) can be found within this water 
resource management framework. The first tier consists of the Minister and DWAF, 
the second tier consists of catchment management agencies (CMA), and the third tier 
consists of water user associations (WUA). WUAs are found at a strictly local level 
and can provide a mechanism through which to implement the catchment 
management strategy at a local level. A WUA is an association of users that may be a 
single-sector or multi-sector association. A single-sector association comprises a 
group of similar users, for example emerging farmers, and acts in the interests of 
those farmers. The process of developing and implementing these management 
institutions began in 2004 and is still underway. It is likely to take several years 
before these institutions are fully established and functional. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
'I, '" '" 
..... i/)(lM",,,., 
... _,.Ut~ 
!/"'1,."',lIhl<> f Otto" I' (agep ""t>'~ 6,,"p/o pm"," t ~ 0 ,Ibm 0 d 
imp!.",,,,, 10 !:( .... (' f!h e Col en IT>" .,1 Moo a<] "en ,01 SIt" I p~ I 
UttctH"NI( 
'$ 4 - .. 7 .... 
l<'igu,·e I: Til. IlIrre lier, (Or WI{M in South Arrica. Sou rce: Adapl.d n·o," UW A F (und.led) 
2.4 Policies alltl Laws reiatetl to CBNRM 
Throughout a wide range or ~xisti"g Sm,th African policies and laws, th~ prc>motion 
or communily involvement in "aluml re"ource managen-..:"t is kgitimis.cd and the 
govcnunent therefore has the obi ig~tio" to cnc(mrage the impl emenl;ltion of CRNR \ 1. 
Th~se inc lude policic:s and laws re lated to a nLLmocr of sectors i"cl"di" g biod iversi ty 
J.[](i conservation, agri~LLllun: and la"d rdimn. marine :md Ire,hwat~r syst~ms, 
forestry and woodlands, and tourism (DEAT, 2003). Ge"erally thc go\,enmlent 
(kpartmems involv~d in impkmc"ting CRNRr>] polici~ s ar~ those thai have direct 
kgblalive control over natural resourccs such as thc Oepaltmel1 to r Water AHai" and 
Forestry (I) W II F) 'Ifld tl-..: I) ~partment 0 r Fnvironm~ntal II lrair~ and I ouri 'n!. 
l"he>c government poli~ie~ ~mbroce f(lm CommOn obj~ctives Wld principles or 
C])\'RM that l1eed to be addressed. These arc: 
• The n~ed to improve the l i vdihood~ or imp"v~rished p"0pic making a li ving 
from ~ommon p'~ll res(mrees. 
• A rcq<liremcm for commwlity participation. 
• Thc need to address hi stori ~al and wntcmporary imhalances in access to 
reSOur~es and capital, and 
• Thc problem ofllnsllsta inahk reSOurce us~. 
(OEAT.2003) 
Ho\\ever. the procc>s of ellS<lring that these objectivcs reach ground Inel is 
undcnnined by a number of practic;11 i"ues. \10'l goveml11~1H departments, 
~spccia[[y in tl-..: E",tern Cilpe, do not have th~ capad ly to illlpkm~nt CBNRtI.\ policy 
objectives. r>]oreover. implementation efforts oftcn lack 'ynergy bet\\~en dincr~m 
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departments instead of co-ordinating the few resources available to work together. 
Efforts therefore often overlap wasting precious capacity to successfully carry out 
CBNRM initiatives (DEAT, 2003). 
Issues aside, water management policies in South Africa reflect clear CBNRM 
objectives. The NWRS looks at the management of water beyond meeting the basic 
human need and focuses on providing water for enterprise development. It does so by 
initiating localised WUA institutions that are designed to empower communities to 
manage their own water resources. In the Eastern Cape, this mainly involves 
previously disadvantaged poor farming communities. The aim is to pool local 
resources together through encouraging community participation and promoting 
sustainable use of their water resources. 
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Common pool theory 
The following section provides a theoretical basis for common pool resource 
management. The development of common property theory helps us understand the 
reasons behind different approaches to natural resource management and why these 
are changing. Common pool theory concepts and definitions are also explored and 
clarified. 
3.1.1 Evolution of common pool theory 
The core of common pool theory is associated with debunking Hardins 1968 'tragedy 
of the commons dilemma' (Shackleton, 1998). Hardins theory argues that all 
resources held in common will inevitably suffer from over exploitation and 
degradation (Hardin, 1968). His theory on natural resource management was based on 
his arguement that a "man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his 
herd without limit - in a world that is limited" and that "having a conscience is self-
eliminating" (Ostrom, 2002 p 11). In other words resources held in common will 
gradually degrade as everyone seeks to maximise individual benefit by 'eating as 
much pie as possible' in fear that they will lose out if they don't. Over time those who 
practice restrained use will lose out economically compared to those practicing 
unrestrained use. His solution to this suggested that effective rules to prevent this 
'dilemma' can only be reached through the state and not by local institutions (Ostrom, 
2002). 
Since the late 70's, Hardin's model has been challenged by a variety of academics 
(Ostrom, 1986 Berkes, 1989 Feeny et aI, 1990). His concept of common property 
management was seen to be confused with open access conditions (Ostrom, 2002). 
Social scientists argued that where long term interests existed for a group of users, 
rules over access and use evolve to avoid overuse and degradation (Ostrom, 2002). 
However it was recognised that these locally created rules for common property 
management were not always successful and so under certain conditions involvement 
of government authorities would be required to intervene to avoid further degradation. 
It was still of utmost importance that intervening external governance authorities 
would need to include local communities in the formation of a new regime where 
location specific characteristics and successful elements of the old regime would still 
be recognised (Ostrom, 2002) 
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The theory of free riding, within Hardin's dilemma, was also challenged by social 
scientists. Research suggested that where a group of resource users repeatedly use a 
common resource, such as rural farmers in a village, restricted use is most often 
preferred so long as other users agree to do the same (Ostrom, 2002). Therefore 
common property management was seen to have a coordination challenge based on 
mutual agreement rather than being an outright 'tragedy' (Ostrom, 2002). 
Case study analysis in developing countries regarding natural resource management 
began to reveal a common theme. Policy reforms transferring natural resource 
governance from local institutions to state authorities, the solution suggested by 
Hardin, only allowed conditions of the resource and resource users to degrade 
(Ostrom, 2002). The question is ... Why was this happening? According to Ostrom 
(1990) and Berkes (1994) governments didn't have the ground capacity to manage 
and monitor resources. Instead of the pre-existing local management regimes with 
some rules on access and use, state management regimes became ineffective due to a 
lack of enforcement by the state. In developing countries, such as in Africa, Hardin's 
solution of state authority was only causing conditions in which his 'dilemma' would 
prevail. Moreover, the lack of enforcement allowed corrupt public officials to gain 
backhand profits from anyone looking to exploit resources (Ostrom, 2002). 
3.1.2 Clarification of key concepts 
In past research there has been much confusion over the terms used in common pool 
theory. The following section aims to clarify some of these terms and concepts. When 
we speak of the commons we refer to anyone of an array of resources, facilities and 
institutions that involve some sort of group access or ownership. For academic 
purposes it is beneficial to distinguish resources from the human arrangements that 
manage these resources (Ostrom, 2002). The term 'common property' has been 
referred to, in many texts, as the resource as well as the management arrangement. 
Therefore to avoid confusion this paper will refer to the actual resource as a 'common 
pool' resource, and 'common property' will refer to the management arrangement 
over the resource as is done in Ostrom (2002). 
A common pool resource has two defining characteristics. Firstly, to exclude someone 
from its use is difficult or costly and secondly, using the resource subtracts from what 
is available for others to use (Ostrom, 2002). This subractability is generally what 
makes resources so difficult to manage (Shackleton, 1998). 
As mentioned earlier common property is one of four broad management regimes. 
Private property, state property and open access are the other management regimes 
although open access is seen by some as a lack of any management regime 
(Shackleton, 1998). It is important to note that there is no clear cut lines between 
regimes and the management of common pool resources may include aspects of 
different regimes. 
A common property regime implies: 
• Ownership and access rights belong to a specified group or community 
where non-members are excluded. Rights and duties of members and 
non-members are defined by set rules regarding access, use and 
management of the common pool resource. To ensure compliance 
penalties are put in place (Shackleton, 1998). 
A state property regime implies: 
• The rights of ownership and management of natural resources are held 
by the government. However, the state may under certain 
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circumstances pass on some of these rights to certain users for 
particular resources. Precise rules and regulations apply and 
enforcement is generally carried out by the state (Shackleton, 1998). 
A private property regime implies: 
• Rights belong to an individual or corporate entity and are protected by 
law. This private property right can be traded through the market 
(Shackleton, 1998). 
An open access regime implies: 
• An absence of a management regime where no-one has ownership 
rights and anyone is allowed to access the resource. This however 
often results in over-exploitation causing degradation of the resource 
(Shackleton, 1998). A state of open access could also occur from a 
state property regime that lacks enforcement (Ostrom, 2002). 
3.1.3 Advocating for common property regimes 
Common property institutions are gaining a large amount of support largely because 
they promote principles of CBNRM. A number of arguments that promote these 
management regimes have been put foreword in the literature by researchers such as 
Berkes and Ostrom (1990) and (2002), Feeny et al (1990), Baland and Platteau 
(1996), and Bromley and Cernae (1989). 
In developing countries most households rely on communal land for food, access to 
water, fuel and shelter on which their existence depends. Privatisation and 
nationalisation take power away from local communities and must therefore deliver 
more effective resource management if they are to improve livelihoods (Shackleton, 
1998). However, these policies have mostly failed to improve the state of common 
pool resources and have decreased the standard of living for the poor and put 
resources in the hands of the rich (Ostrom, 2002). Maintaining common property 
regimes keeps resources in the hands of the people who are most dependent on them 
and therefore provides a safety net for the poor (Shackleton, 1998). 
Common property regimes allow for more equitable natural resource distribution. In 
developing countries the elite hold most of the natural resources. Private ownership of 
land, in comparison to community ownership, often reaps short term benefits off the 
land and is less dependable on future survival of the natural resource. Therefore 
private ownership might promote less sustainable use. Communities that rely on the 
land for survival have few alternatives and higher long term stakes, and are therefore 
more likely to promote sustainable use. 
It has been repeatedly shown that community based management institutions have 
been far more successful than state property regimes in preventing natural resource 
degradation (Shackleton, 1998). Bromley and Cernea (1989) argue that one of the 
most important lessons of the last half century lies in the systematic failures of state-
centralised management of resources. 
Economically, Runge (1986) emphasises that common property management within 
the context of rural village life is more viable in developing countries. Transaction 
costs are much lower for common property than for private property. Transaction 
costs for private property are too high for the poor to afford. Secondly, where 
resources are widely spread there is less risk for the individual if they are held in 
common than if held in private. This promotes incentive to abide by rules and 
encourages social stability (Shackleton, 1998). 
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3. 2 COl1ditiol1 .\' cOl1ducive to success f ill collective actioll 
In tile last two dc:cooes r~SI.'<lrch h1\, explored whkh dl<lnKkri,tics ofn,'tur:>1 
n:sources <lrc fil\'Oumblc for e~tablbhing anu sustaining in~titulions lha( preyent 
degradmion of COmmOn pool n::>0me~S (Doisak <lnd Oslrom. 2003). IdeCi,y ,md 
A~h~~on (1987) illld O,trom (1990) identified e~J1Din re~ource chDmcteri,ties that 
proTllote ,uecessflll COmmon pool ,nanDgemcnL A~ re,.,areh in th~ fidu incr~D>cd 
other eh,lnICleri>(io \\~r~ illso identifi..,d as key ji!Ctors in detemlining (he ,H~cess of 
common povl r~,ouree mmmgcm~nt. Th~s~ incllld~ clmmctcl'istics oftlw r~sourcc 
appropriators wld concept~ ,e>eh a, noru iinL'~ (19n) '",eiDI capi tDr \Wr~ i ntrouuced 
(0 Ih.., literillure (Dolsuk and Ostrom, 20m j. Similar research was dC\·doped for 
fa\ouruble charact~ristic~ lhat lhe ~eonom i e Lnvimnment, kgal cnvimnm~nt anu 
in,titutimml de,ign pnl\'ided 10 enh,lllc~ common pool r~souree milllilgement, 
rhe tDhlc below presents a ,.;1 0 r charactcri~( ie, ~olldtLeive 10 ~tLece,~ lui common pool 
resoure~ managemLnL I ( W<l~ d",\'~ k\ped by Sh<l~kleton ( 1998) hy LX'lmining a ntLmhn 
of uilkrmt wuree~ induding old surviving succes,fill mallilgement system, as well ,IS 
ncw succc~~ful approaehe~ (hm have rC-~~lahhshcu COmmon property n::gimcs. 
theoretical modd~, 1!nu LX fl\'rienecs <lrK1 k,son s k'lmed from il T1lng~ 0 r e1!"; sludi ~~ 
(Sh1!ekelion, 1998). A number ofreseDr~he, ideD, and studi..,s were unlwn on 10 create 
this wblc of critcrLD (O~trom 1992. Critchley and TUITI~r 1996, UD I,mu and l'lutteml 
1996. \Vadc 19H7. La"ry 199{J,Cou~in~ 1996), 
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4. ST UDY A REA OVERVI EW 
This paper compares two WUA institutions ag~inst ~rikri~ lhal are r~'l"ir~d lor 
successful local level mlural reS(lur~e managemell1. The following chapler provid~s 
an overview of the ,!lid" area characteristics in which the two case study sites are 
ltl(;m~d m unler to gi'" cOllk~\ 10 the rese:lr~h limiings in chapl"r 5. 
4. J Localion 
The WMA boulldJries sd hy the ~WI{S arc based on geographical boundari~s and 
tkr~forc differ to poiiticJi boundari"s_ Figure 2 aho\''' shows thi, differellce clearly 
with (he II) WMAs owrJaymg the provincial ar~as. The \11'0 WL' As are wilhin lhe 
Amatok district municipality (s,,~ red OlLtline in ligure 2) which is ~ituatcd in Vi/l.1A 
12 an<l on tile centra] coasl.lill~ of tile East~rn Cape. Figure 3 show~ Ih~ exad ioo<\iOfls 
of (he eDikeni and 'vIasikhany" weAs w;(hin th~ Anmlol" di,uie! municipality. 
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Amatole 
F • __ ""' 
M MM.~'" """ 
l'i::III'O 3: Mar ,hI)" in:: I",·,ninn nr WI:..\., "ith in A mat"l . Oi,t";,. 1. 
Sn" rce: Adapto(t fro"" tl\liAt" (20{)4b) 
4. 2 Delllof.:raphy 
In terms of the 2002 cenSliS. the Amatol~ dislrict in the Ea,;lern Cape has a fX'pulmion 
of 953,000 anu lS expectcd to grow to 1.2 million by 2025. [[("'ever this "'Towth i~ lO 
take place in urban areas that arc expecting ecotlornic grmHh and employment 
opporlunilies su~h as the BufJillo City municipality. Curr~lltly only aoout 26% of the 
population live in urban area , and the other 74% live in mral villages. Thi , is 
predicted to change as pnpulations in rura l areas will Uccline uuc to urban mignttion 
and ,.s the effects of HIViA][)S I>ccom~ eviuenL (DWAF, 2004h) 
4.3 Lal/d tel/ure 
Land tefllll'e in the Eastern Cape is a complex issue as m,.ny different systems arc 
fo"nu, Within the form~r Ciskei and Transk~i homelilnds fiv~ diflerenl sy~(ems ~xist. 
'lhese include triba l. freehold, Slal~, mlinicip,.1 and institLltiotul (churches etc) land. 
Eighty p~r~enl of tile fonner homeiJmi area i, he ld l"lder modified trib,.lland lenur~ 
whik the majority of land wi thin the former South African areas i, held undet 
freehold title, (DWAF. 2004b) The conccpt of modi tied trihal land tenllre refers to 
land that is state owned 11l1t IraditiOlml leaders sli ll have an inlluence on access and 
owncrship (FAO. I en7). 
II is impNtantlo note thai dL'" to notic~ahk d~~radalion on lribal lands, atlempls have 
heen made to change lhis tenLlre system. However. these all~mpls havc not be~n vcry 
suc~es~rul (0\1/ AF, 2004 j, 
4.4 Ecollomic tleve/opmellt 
The Eastern CalX' hilS a \'ery high rural population with a relatively w~ak ~Cl~lOlny 
(DWAI·. ~004b). Stat~ S<){\'ic~s and rCSOllrces for futih~r development ar~ lhere!ore 
limilcu. Fasl r .onJon is th~ C~lI1re of economic activity with the harbour, airport, 
highway, and mil way connections. The gmwth anu development strategy for the area 
ha> i(kntified four sectors on whid\ to n>cus its reSOurCeS. These include: 
manufw;turing industries mainly within thc Uufl"alo City municipality; lourism along 
ib coast as ",ell a" in Hog<,back; commcr~ial I;,restry amunu the Amatok mountain 
mnge; and agricultllf~l related activilies oUlside the urhan arcas. Tlwse agricultural 
activities in man) or the poWrl) ~lrick~n poor farming area,; will however rely 
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heavily on the success of rehabilitating the old irrigation schemes and the success of 
local resource management institutions (DWAF, 2004b). 
4.5 Physical characteristics 
The Amatole district catchments have their water sources within the Amatole 
mountain range that peaks near Hogsback at an altitude of 1960 meters above sea 
level. From here these rivers flow in a south easterly direction towards the coastline 
and into the Indian Ocean. Soils in the Eastern Cape are dispersive in nature and once 
the vegetation is removed the topsoil erosion is extremely fast. These soils make their 
way into rivers increasing the suspended load causing a decrease in water quality and 
more rapid dam siltation. Natural resource and land management policies therefore 
need to be effective in tackling this issue. The climate and temperature varies in 
relation to altitude and proximity to the coast. Temperature variations are more stable 
along the coast whereas frost is often experienced inland during winter with snow 
often falling in the Amatole mountain range while summer can bring temperatures 
exceeding 40 degrees Celsius. The summer rainfall season produces a healthy 1200 
mm per annum in the upper Amatole catchments. Savannah and grassland biomes 
dominate the rich diversity of vegetation in the Amatole area. This diversity is being 
threatened by alien invasives, overgrazing, burning, wood gathering, and poor 
farming methods therefore further enhancing the need for effective land management 
systems. Alien invasives such as wattles and eucalyptus species are widely spread 
across the region. In many dams water weed, such as hyacinth, problems are 
increasing as algal blooms are spurred on by rising pollution levels. Forest area 
vegetation is concentrated in the Amatole mountain range. Land use includes 
livestock farming, subsistence farming mainly in the former homeland areas, 
commercial vegetation and pineapple farming, several irrigation developments and 
commercial forestation (DWAF, 2004b). 
4.6 The state of water resources in the study area 
Even though rainfall in Amatole is not very high, the demand is still less than the 
current yield and therefore surplus water supply is available. Having this surplus 
supply is uncommon in South Africa and therefore water conservation is still essential 
to ensure efficient use and stable future supply. The demand in comparison to the 
yield in the area is low because many dams were built on the large rivers with future 
visions of downstream irrigation development. However most of these did not 
materialise and those irrigation schemes that did materialise became defunct. So these 
areas may be experiencing a surplus of water but the lack of treatment facilities and 
bulk supply infrastructure is likely to result in an overwhelming demand for treated 
water especially in growing urban areas. Even though progress has been made with 
building this required infrastructure, many projects have been delayed due to a lack of 
funds and resources (DWAF, 2004b). 
In the rural areas of the Eastern Cape 63% of the population have access to treated 
water and only 30% have adequate sanitation facilities. This raises concern with 
regards to health risks from poor water quality as many people still use river water for 
basic needs. Water quality is hardest hit in highly populated urban areas but in the 
more rural areas water quality ranges from good to medium. The quality of the water 
is generally deteriorated by soil erosion, overloaded sewage works, unlicensed waste 
sites, poor sewage infrastructure, and runoff from settlements with insufficient 
sanitation. These factors also impact the ground water supply which is a water source 
for many villages (DWAF, 2004b). 
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4. 7 The two case study sites 
The following section gives a brief description of the areas under the jurisdiction of 
the two WUA institutions. The different stages of establishment for each WUA will 
also be made clear. 
The following characteristics are shared by both areas. The WUAs are located in the 
north of the Amatole district municipality. The local municipalities have not 
performed to the required standard in the past with regards to collecting water tariffs 
and so Amatole district municipality has assumed control. The assigned WSP for 
these areas is the Amatola Water Board. The villages in both areas can be 
characterised by resource-poor communities who rely mainly on farming for survival 
and income. Infrastructure and basic services are generally poor. 
4.7.1 Masikhanye WUA area 
Masikhanye WUA is located in an area of the upper Keiskamma river catchment. It 
consists of six villages just below Sandile Dam as can be seen in Figure 4. Five of the 
villages are located inside the Amahlati local municipality and the other in Knonkobe 
local municipality. The governments aim was to reduce operation and maintenance 
costs of infrastructure including irrigation schemes around Sandile Dam and to 
devolve management of irrigation schemes to the local level. The WUA was initiated 
by DWAF to assist in fulfilling these aims (Ntsonto, 2005). Local farmers in 
Masikhanye also expressed a need for improved water access and management of the 
irrigation scheme. The WUA is not a transformed irrigation board as no committee 
previously existed. OW AF assisted with the election of an interim committee 
consisting of representatives from each village. Their constitution has been drafted 
and awaits approval from the Minister after which the WUA will become a legally 
recognised institution and a governing board will be selected. The interim committee 
currently meets about once a month while they await approval. 
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4.7.2 eOikeoi \VLlA area 
'" 
cDiktni \VCA is iOCHtcd in (he upp;..,- ~a(chm~nt orth~ 'Illume river. It i~ much lJrger 
and consists of about 30 to 40 villages ill and around l3inlkld Park Dam as can he 
se~n in Fi gur~ 5. All or \h~w vi ll ag~s arC located inside th~ Kh\nk(\hc local 
municipality. locJi fHrmers, comprising. of mainly I~malcs nom difft:renl smail 
farming projects, rtqucslcd that an association he set up to impro,-~ wakr supply and 
manag~mclll or thei r projects as well as mah lise of surrounding dcfimd irrigation 
s~hemes. Establi shing. th~ WUA w·,,, thell initiated by DWAF. Theil' constitu tl on hm; 
since then OCLll ~L1hmillcd, approvcd and gazetted (G()\'Cnlln~l]t ).Il\ li ~t ~l\. 9<)1) . 
They meel regularly in Alice and are cUI'rcntly al the Siakehohkr cnga)'cm~nl sta),e 
hcfore lht eleclion or a ~(Wern illg hoard. 'I hey art al~o in thc prtxoess o r "Tiling up 
busincss plJns for thcir fJrlllinll p roj~e l s and irril1alion schemes. 
Th~ cOlnmunilics within the ~lud) areaS arc the ]llml poor whose li\diht,od~ largdy 
d,;pend on fJnning. The land and natu rall'~sourccs ar,; pr~dOlllinantl y stat~ ov,'n~d but 
access and ownLrship is in many vi llages ~nbjcet to tl'Jditional go\ernance. Watcr 
rc~ourcc supply is availah le jilr ust hlll infraslructure for ae<:~ss is poor. These arc 
som~ of lhc main characteristics that high li l<\ht tht l~ed for effedi"", local level 
mmlal<\emtnt o r water rtsollrc~s in tht sllldy area. The ncxt ebapter ass~ss~s how 
condllclV~ th~ ~h"raderisti~s in thi! study ar~as me fo l' sliccessfLlI local Ie,el 
managemenl. 
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5. PERFORMANCE OF WUAS AGAINST CRITERIA 
Using information gathered from the two case studies including interviews with key 
informants, participatory workshops, and observation, the two WUAs institutions will 
now be evaluated against Shackleton's criteria for successful local level resource 
management institutions. These criteria will be assessed under the broad headings 
provided by Shackletons framework namely, nature of the resource, nature of the 
resource users, institutional issues, nature of rules and regulations, economic issues 
and policy issues. Each section will begin with a brief overview of what the broad 
criteria entails followed by relevant research findings related to the WUA institutions 
under investigation. 
5.1 Nature of the resource 
Certain characteristics of a natural resource allow for easier common property 
management. Clear-cut boundaries are essential for successful management so that 
exclusion of non-members is possible. The smaller the resource size the easier it will 
be to manage and monitor logistically. But more importantly a small area fosters a 
greater knowledge of its micro environments and builds onto a common 
understanding of the resource and its use. A technical understanding of the ecological 
properties of the resource is also essential so as not to overlook long-term negative 
effects of current use levels. A rapidly renewable resource is easier to manage as its 
replacement pressure is less. However, resource scarcity can provide incentives for 
collective action that promotes sustainable use and resource security. Similarly, when 
dependency on a resource is high, awareness regarding its use and current state is 
high. This encourages effective management and monitoring systems to be in place. 
Resources that have reliable indicators to measure its condition and the impacts of 
individual regular use raise awareness and encourage collective action towards 
sustainable use (Shackleton, 1998). 
Water does not have clear boundaries as it flows into an area and out again. However, 
in both case studies water is stored in dams and water infrastructure where only 
members of the WUA, that have a water licence, are granted access for fatming or 
enterprise purposes. The Masikhanye WUA is still in a relatively early stage of 
establishment and farmers are still trying to obtain water licences. Non-members are 
excluded by way of licenses but it is more complex in rural areas as observed in both 
ofthe WUAs. Illegal connections are widespread in the area and provide an inroad for 
non-members. Some villagers in both sites suggested that traditionally water is seen as 
a customary right as it comes from the land off which they live and therefore a license 
system may not work. The size of water as a resource also poses problems. eDikeni 
has a larger watershed and controlling activities that impact on water supply in large 
area is difficult. Furthermore education in both study sites is very low therefore the 
flow of impacts from polluting activities through the water cycle not understood. For 
example villagers using chemicals to dip their livestock in the catchment area do not 
think that these chemicals will enter the river system. The NWRS has attempted to 
make areas under the jurisdiction of WUAs as small as possible but eDikeni and 
Masikhanye are both relatively large. 
Water renews itself very rapidly making it easy to manage but scarcity is an issue. As 
mentioned earlier the study area has surplus water. Even though this surplus supply 
exists, farmers in both WUAs made it clear that the process of accessing water for use 
is a problem. In Masikhanye farmers complained that the water pipe infrastructure to 
their fields was not sufficient and most of the pipes were not being maintained and 
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therefore damaged beyond use. In eDikeni some farmers had no piping infrastructure 
and used donkey carts to haul water from the river. Once access is gained the 
perception of water scarcity may fall away. The dependency on water in both WUAs 
is extremely high as it is essential for farmers who rely on their crops not only for 
income but for survival. Water use and the state of its condition is currently not 
monitored in both WUA areas. Water supply to individual farmers in the study area is 
not being monitored and neither is supply to individual households, therefore there is 
no feedback to water users and the opportunity to raise awareness is lost. 
5.2 Nature of the resource users 
The smaller the user group is and the closer they reside to the resource the better. If 
user group size is small then costs of decision making and communication are low, 
enforcement of rules is easier, and permitted access more visible. Moreover 
community cohesiveness and collective responsibility tends to be stronger. A higher 
degree of homogeneity also favours common property resource management and 
according to Ostrom (2002) the group must not be strongly divided by natural 
boundaries, different perceptions of long term use, cultural hostility, and different 
exposures to risk. If a community has had a history of cooperative success peoples 
trust in others' willingness to work together is high. One of the main characteristics of 
users for successful common property resource management is trust and reciprocity. 
People need to feel secure about long term commitment and promise keeping. This 
also requires rules regarding use and management to be clearly defined. As mentioned 
earlier the knowledge that people have on the resource is critical such as knowledge 
on ecological properties, supply vs. demand, impacts of long term use, and the 
relationships between these (Shackleton, 1998). 
The user group in the two WUAs display some characteristics that are not conducive 
to collective action. A key finding from research was that trust within water users and 
also between water users and government is lacking. The research showed that in the 
study area education and knowledge of water as a natural resource is poor as well as a 
high degree of confusion over the rules regarding access and conservation exist. The 
user group size, especially in eDikeni, consists of many villages and therefore very 
large. The proximity of residence to the resource was generally found to be a far 
walking distance. The lack of trust in many rural areas is a problem as suspicion over 
the motives of others is often rife. Trust has been broken down in the past by forced 
removals and the erosion of social relations. Apartheid fostered mistrust between 
people and especially between communities and their traditional leaders. This said, 
the research showed that community trust of the traditional leaders was very site 
specific. Some leaders are well respected and have built up trust through past actions 
while other areas tend not to recognise their traditional leaders in community action 
and governance. 
Knowledge of the water resource in these two areas and how it should be used by the 
communities has been passed down through generations but few understand the water 
cycle from a scientific perspective. This understanding is important but education is 
lacking in these rural areas due to past inequities and inadequate government 
resources. An example is that stock farmers in both study sites often do not recognise 
that releasing the dipping waste into the ground away from the river would affect the 
water supply. Poor education and large group size ties in with the lack of awareness 
and general understanding of the rules around water access. Community members in 
both these areas are not sure who has rights to access and who exactly the WUA 
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institution was set up to serve. Conservation related regulations were non existent in 
both study areas and the vast majority did not know what actions would impact on 
water supply. 
The WUA institutions in the study sites also have characteristics that promote 
collective action. In both communities it was found that they have experienced 
successful collective action in the past, the degree of homogeneity is high, and a water 
license system is in place. Regarding past collective action research showed that 
church groups in eDikeni have worked together on farming projects before the WUA 
was set up. In Masikhanye farming co-opts were working together in part to revitalise 
the Zanyokwe irrigation scheme. Areas where traditional governance is still strong 
have regular meetings, 'imbizos', with the whole community to discuss issues and 
work through them. These 'imbizos' are held regularly in both study sites and show 
that there is good communication within the community. 
Additional factors favouring collective action include a relatively high level of 
homogeneity amongst resource users in the study sites exist. Cultural hostility is 
minimal if not non-existent, as too is different exposures to risk. In terms of eligibility 
to water access, even though illegal use and confusion over rules of use and 
membership is high in the study sites, the WUAs still have the license system in place 
which grants legal rights to use water. 
5.3 Institutional issues 
Institutional issues are important not only to ensure that the WUA fits into an existing 
network of institutions but also to ensure that it focuses on developing key aspects 
that will improve chances of success. Securing ownership for users and ensuring that 
their legal claim of access to water will be sustained, is essential. It is advisable to get 
people involved that have had prior experience in collective action such as village 
committees, business organisations, or ideally anyone who has been involved with the 
management of other common pool resources. It is also important to have a local legal 
entity that can enforce sanctions as well as a higher body to get both legal and 
resource support. This helps local communities with difficult decisions that could 
break down social cohesion. The local institution must also be flexible to change its 
structure when the environment around it changes. If the resource area is large, 
smaller nested institutions may help to manage the resource area more effectively 
(Shackleton, 1998). 
Every institution has always got a better chance of success with a good leader who 
can be a role model, ensure fairness, empower people to be aware of real challenges in 
their life, convince people that they can benefit from group action as well as mobilise 
this action, and finally enforcing rules while managing conflict. 
Many of these institutional criteria described above are not in place in the WUA 
institutions examined. These include insufficient outside facilitation and support in 
establishing the WUAs, lack of enforcement mechanisms, conflict between traditional 
and government authority systems, an inflexible institutional structure, and a lack of 
good leadership. 
The process of facilitating the establishment of these two WUAs is currently being 
undertaken by DW AF but progress has been very slow. The research showed that 
regular communication between DW AFs facilitator and Masikhanye is a problem due 
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to a far travelling distance existing between the DWAF office and the study site, 
communication technology in the rural areas is very low, and DW AFs human 
resources are stretched over various projects. However the WUA in eDikeni received 
additional support from the department of agriculture with extension officers living in 
study area giving more regular support. The structure of the NWRS is such that 
WUAs are the local level institutions within a tiered network of supporting 
institutions namely the CMA and WMA. But, in WMA 12 no CMA has been 
established yet. Both case study WUAs therefore have to rely on DWAF for support 
regarding facilitating establishment, providing necessary training to the WUAs 
committee members, and to monitor progress. However, interviews suggested that 
DW AF already lacks monetary and human resources to be completely effective. 
The areas under the two WUAs are large which makes legal enforcement of water 
access difficult. Currently there is no monitoring of water use in the two areas and 
therefore no feedback is possible. This undermines the WUAs accountability and the 
ability to evaluate its progress as a sustainable institution. With the introduction of a 
state governance system, the traditional authority system in this area is threatened. In 
the study areas, villagers were not clear if the main authority rested with the 
traditional leader or ward councillor. This leaves room for conflict 
Regarding the institutional structure, DW AF has drawn up a set of very rigid 
guidelines of functions and rules that allow little room for community developed 
rules. Moreover the WUAs constitution, and changes to it, need to be signed and 
approved by the Minister of DWAF. Not only does this take a sense of local 
ownership away from the institutions but the process is also extremely long. Evidence 
of this was seen in the eDikeni WUA where it took over 2 years for their constitution 
to be approved. The structure is clearly very rigid. As mentioned earlier, in section 
5.2, trust within the communities and between users and government is lacking. This 
is a key issue that any local institution managing common resources needs to address, 
especially when the state is so intricately involved. Finally, leadership is problematic 
as it requires a clear understanding of the functions and purposes of the WUA, yet 
hardly anyone new exactly what these were. Shackltons criteria (see Table I) show 
that in traditional areas leaders who are younger, educated, have been exposed to the 
outside world, and still show respect for the traditional system have been most 
successful. The two WUA had very different leaders one of whom was close to fitting 
this profile. 
Some characteristics of the two WUA institutions favour collective action in these 
rural areas. These include providing secure access to water for users as well as having 
a basic level of local level organisational experience. Access to water is secured by 
attaining a license through these WUAs but many people in the study area still access 
water illegally. In both study sites, illegal use is not being monitored and enforcement 
is limited. Therefore illegal use will continue to occur and could detract from legal 
water users rights of access to water. An interview with an NGO in the area suggested 
that organisational experience amongst villagers in most rural areas is not usually the 
problem as organisations relating to health, religion, and farming are common, as seen 
in the study area. However, commitment to remaining on the committee so that 
building the skills and knowledge for effective water resource management is a 
common problem. This was evident in the Masikhanye interim committee where half 
of the members were leaving the committee. Moreover, many of the skills required to 
perform the functions set out in both WUAs constitutions are technical and generally 
exceed the capacity of villagers in the study area. Regarding local authority, once the 
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two WUAs are gazetted they have the authority to legitimise enforcement of user 
rights and operating arrangements. However enforcement over such large areas 
requires funding which is not available and difficult decisions could require a higher 
authority. 
5.4 Nature of rules, regulations and sanctions 
Rules are the backbone of institutions but the people who they influence need to 
believe in the principles behind them if they are to be effective. Past experience has 
shown certain characteristics of rules for common property resource management 
have been successful. Firstly, locals need to 'own' the rules by incorporating their 
own customary systems and beliefs. However technical knowledge is crucial and 
needs to be merged into locally derived rules. Flexibility is important to accommodate 
changing resource conditions. Fewer, more simple rules are not only understood 
quickly but easily transmitted and therefore become clear amongst the whole 
community. Unrealistic rules are often not adhered to and can undercut achievability 
of goals. Punishments must be widely understood and effectively carried out and to 
ensure fairness punishments must match the seriousness of infringement. Most 
importantly rules must be monitored and enforced to avoid free riding. If not then a 
common property management regime could fall into an open access regime allowing 
for overuse and deterioration (Shackleton, 1998). 
The nature of rules that promote successful management unfortunately do not 
compare well with those existing in the case study sites. Firstly, in the design and 
implementation of the NWRS, the research showed that traditional authorities in the 
Eastern Cape were sidelined. The state created a rigid set of guidelines for the 
implementation and establishment of WUAs allowing little room for flexibility and 
incorporation of customary systems and rules, as explained earlier. It is a state 
dominated process. The rules are therefore more technical and the research showed 
that community members in the study sites struggled to understand the rules. 
Approaches to monitoring and in the two study sites are also not appropriate for local 
level collective action. Key issues in both WUAs are that many users do not know the 
rules for legal water use, and moreover, illegal use is not considered a big issue in the 
community. Monitoring of illegal use is not done very diligently and where illegal use 
has been identified by the general public or the WUA, not much has been done about 
it for a number of reasons. These reasons include that the community is empathetic 
towards farmers because water access is necessary for survival. Costs are also 
incurred in reporting illegal use while fear exists of resentment from the offender if 
reported. For these reasons, successful resource management systems often use 
'official' monitors appointed by the local institution. But generally these officials 
need an incentive to take their job seriously which most likely involves costs. The 
support of the CMA or local authorities could help with enforcement but this does not 
currently happen. The WUAs in the study sites are however, not fully up and running 
and therefore future plans for enforcement and monitoring are still being developed. 
5.5 Economic issues 
Some important economic concepts that relate to local natural resource management 
are discussed in this section. Economic incentive is a crucial aspect of common 
property resource management that cannot be underestimated. Perceived benefits of 
adhering to institutional rules must exceed perceived costs of joint action. The 
resource must also have a high value placed on it by locals for their economic and 
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social survival. Benefits from a common resource must also be distributed equitably 
which includes equating benefits received to individual effort of input. Finally the 
higher the value of the common pool resource the higher the incentive is to conserve it 
(Shackleton, 1998). 
Unfortunately, many resource management regimes only create benefits in the long 
term and locals often require immediate compensation for efforts they put in if they 
are to participate. However, in the two study sites the WUAs do provide farmers 
needing access to water immediate benefits are if they join the WUA. A water licence 
is obtained through the WUA and if the farmer is previously disadvantaged then they 
are eligible for subsidies. All the farmers in both WUAs fall into this previously 
disadvantaged category. Payment for the water they use will be free for the first year 
and will gradually increase until they are paying the full amount after five years. In 
addition, the WUA is designed to pool community resources, such as knowledge and 
equipment, together so that individual costs of access are minimised as well as 
individual risk. Committee members and farmers also receive free training and 
capacity building to perform their tasks more efficiently. For example, the eDikeni 
WUA is currently assisting members with the development of business plans. In 
Masikhanye, with the assistance of DOA, farming skills are being developed and 
farming equipment is shared. A major problem arises with the fact that water supply 
and quality is influenced by all activities in the watershed area. Managing activities in 
this watershed by non-members is difficult because they have no economic incentives 
to restrict their activity. For example, a stock farmer requires grazing land for his 
cattle and overgrazing by his cattle could affect runoff and therefore water quality. 
They have no incentive to restrict their grazing. Activities, such as this, need to be 
monitored and regulated to maintain a healthy catchment and a sustainable water 
supply. Restricting these activities that locals rely on for income and survival is 
difficult. Catchment management and conservation is largely the responsibility of the 
CMA but the CMA is non-existent in the study areas. 
Regarding equitable distribution of benefits, it is important to negotiate clear contracts 
for distribution before benefits appear. If not, conflict often arises and the powerful 
elite usually end up appropriating an unfair portion. In telms of creating a high value 
for water, the resource value is directly related to how much money farmers get from 
trading produce. DOA is currently helping farmers improve production and getting 
markets for their produce. Without steady access to water, production of crops will be 
low and thus income will be limited. Therefore a high value is placed on water by 
emerging farmers in the study area. The incentive to conserve water is high. 
5.6 Policy issues 
Political issues and government support playa key role in developing successful local 
institutions. The state needs to recognise common property rights as it does private 
property to minimise external threats. The state should not only protect local rights 
but facilitate and support the development of local organisations. Donor agencies and 
NGOs can also have a crucial role to play in capacity building, facilitation, and 
training. They can also help government identify balances between common property 
management regimes and other resource regimes (Shackleton, 1998). 
Once the Minister gazettes the WUA constitution, it becomes a local legal entity 
thereby recognising the water rights that its members have. But the process of 
establishing these WUAs has been very slow and members in both WUAs have lost 
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interest. DWAF in the Eastern Cape lacks resources, and in addition, the CMA has not 
been established yet. NGOs have the expertise, experience and time for providing 
intense facilitation and support yet using NGOs has not been utilised by DW AF in 
either of the case study sites. In these two WUA areas, the state is currently playing a 
very dominant role instead of taking on more of an enabling and supportive role. 
5.7 Summary of key findings 
In the two case study WUAs, many characteristics were not conducive to successful 
local level management. Both of the areas under the jurisdiction of each WUA were 
very large creating difficulties for monitoring and enforcement of water access. 
However no monitoring or enforcement was even in place. Therefore feedback on 
water usage was weak, and no enforcement allowed for illegal use and uncontrolled 
catchment activities to continue. A lack of trust within the communities as well as 
between water users and the state was a key finding that inhibits social cohesion and 
co-operation necessary for common resource management. Water users also struggled 
to understand the functions and purposes of the WUAs as well as basic scientific 
concepts of the water cycle. Effective participation in the establishment and 
management of the WUA by villagers was therefore limited. Institutional 
characteristics of the both WUAs are not promising. The CMA - the main supporting 
institution to the WUAs - has not been established yet leaving all supporting 
responsibilities with a resource short DWAF. Facilitation and support from DWAF, 
especially in Masikhanye, is therefore not sufficient. NGO's with experience and 
expertise in local development have not been utilised thus far. The WUA 
establishment process has thus far been dominated by the state and the development 
of rules and regulations has not been very inclusive. The rules are also relatively 
inflexible. Political tension between the traditional authorities and state authorities is 
evident. 
A few characteristics have been found to be conducive to successful local level 
institutions. Homogeneity of the user group is strong promoting co-operation as needs 
tend to be similar. Regular traditional 'imbizos' in the two WUA study sites also 
showed good community communication. Incentives for small scale farmers to join 
the WUA are good. If they join the WUA their water bills are initially subsidized, 
they can obtain a water licence to access water legally, and it is likely they will 
receive farming support from the WUA. However, incentives for other community 
groups to join the WUA are not evident. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
6.1 State held control 
There seems to be a distinct theme arising around the amount of control and power 
that the state is willing devolve, or more so the lack thereof that seems to be 
undermining the possible success of WUA institutions. This theme is embedded in a 
number of issues mentioned in section six including, the rigidity of the rules within 
the WUA implementation guidelines and DWAF's facilitation and implementation 
strategy. 
The success of local institutions relies on the rules being developed by the resource 
users themselves. However the guidelines developed by DWAF for the establishment 
and implementation of WUAs are rigid and do not allow for much flexibility. And 
where flexibility does exist to change rules laid out in the WUA constitution, these 
changes must be approved by the Minister, which as the case studies showed can be a 
lengthy process. The ownership of rules currently lies with the state which goes 
against CBNRM principles and is likely to discourage local participation. 
The implementation approach adopted by D WAF is also contrary to IWRM as well as 
CBNRM principles, specifically the need to engage all stakeholders. The purpose of 
stakeholder engagement is to truly acknowledge what interested parties have to say. 
Not only because it is a legislative requirement but because stakeholders are more 
likely to comply if they are involved and their opinions will also most likely add 
value. Understandably, OW AF in the Eastern Cape is under-resourced and 
approaching all stakeholders is unrealistic. But, involving key stakeholders is essential 
and would help reduce wasted resources by integrating stakeholder's inputs 
throughout the process instead of through a more costly "trial and error" process. For 
example, the House of Traditional Leaders (HOTL) was not approached by DWAF 
regarding the development of the NWRS and development of WUAs. Political issues 
obviously exist between the two governance systems and exclusion of traditional 
leaders in these new governance processes is likely to worsen the relationship. This 
could possibly interfere with successful implementation of these WUAs given the 
traditional leaders status and role in some of these rural communities. HOTL could 
have helped DWAF understand the local conditions, customary systems and rules and 
how these could be incorporated into the new water resource management strategy. 
For example, DWAF could have used existing traditional communication lines, such 
as the 'imbizos', to create awareness and understanding regarding the purpose of the 
WUA institutions. DWAF could have saved resources in the long run by using more 
resources initially to involve more stakeholders in the planning stages. 
DW AF has also opted to facilitate the process of establishing the WUA. Yet they 
know they are under resourced to do so effectively. They are obtaining help from the 
Department of Agriculture (DOA) which has many agricultural extension officers in 
the field. However the importance of facilitation must not be underestimated, 
especially in the less developed rural areas where education is low. Building capacity 
within a local institution to sustain itself is a time demanding process that must be 
sustained over a long period. The current level of facilitation is nowhere near 
sufficient, largely due to the lack of human resources, and yet DWAF have not looked 
at the option of using NGOs to fill this role. Various NGOs have experience in 
successfully setting up local institutions using principles of CBNRM. Locals are also 
more likely to trust an NGO that has worked in the area because they are impartial 
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and may have worked in areas previously. NO Os also tend to emphasise issues of 
participation, equity, local knowledge, and sustainability more diligently because the 
NOOs performance is measured on these factors. DWAF on the other hand are under 
tremendous pressure to fulfil a mandate and need to stipulate a given time period for 
completing a task. The need to fulfil this mandate as soon as possible may be 
affecting the level of community involvement in these WUA establishment process. 
Understandably, the CMA has not been setup yet in the study area and DWAF are 
taking on many of their responsibilities. Whether the WUAs should have been set up 
before the CMA was established is another vital question that only time will answer. 
Nonetheless, DWAF has opted to set up the WUAs but the research suggests they 
should be looking at the possibility of outsourcing facilitation to institutions which 
have the expertise, experience, and resources required to ensure success. 
6.2 The complexity of managing of water 
The nature of water is such that it is difficult to determine its boundaries. The water 
cycle is a continuous flow where impacts on water quality and quantity can occur 
anywhere within this cycle. Water flows from one user to the next carrying with it the 
impacts of previous users. According to Shackleton (1998) these characteristics make 
the management of water extremely difficult. 
With reference to South Africa's water policy, a WUA is a group of individual water 
users who wish to undertake water-related activities for their mutual benefit. In the 
case study area, the two WUAs were initiated by farmers for the mutual benefit of 
farmers to access water. WUAs also need to ensure the sustainability of the resource 
which requires conservation and management within the entire watershed area. Most 
resource related activities within the watershed area effect water supply and 
sustainability and therefore these activities need to be managed. However a problem 
of economics arises. Value addition needs to go hand in hand with conservation 
enforcement to ensure sustainability. The farmers are likely to abide by WUAs 
conservation rules because effective conservation secures a steady supply of water 
which in tum contributes to a steady output of produce, and therefore income, for the 
farmers. On the other hand a cattle farmer relies on grazing land for income. The 
WUAs conservation rules may require farmers to restrict their activities as 
overgrazing negatively affects water quality and supply. However, cattle farmers have 
no incentive to restrict cattle grazing since there are no tangible benefits to them. A 
successful sustainable programme should ensure that individual short term benefits 
gained must outweigh the costs of restricting such activities, whether they are part of 
the WUA or not. 
As mentioned above, water management involves all activities and people within a 
watershed area. The NW A allows for groups with mutual interests to establish a 
WUA. This strategy does not combine well with the type of management the nature of 
water requires. The NWA stipulates however, that a WUA must have community 
wide representivity which compliments the all inclusive management required for 
successful water resource management. As suggested in Shackleton's criteria, where 
the area of resource management is large it may be appropriate to create nested 
groups. An all inclusive WUA could be more successful if it were to have these 
nested groups of mutual interest. These nested groups could be for example farming 
co-operatives, household water users, stock fam1ers, and even a group for sustainable 
management to enforce rules and supply 'official' monitors. Each nested group would 
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have a representative on the WUA committee to raise concerns and suggestions from 
their particular mutual interest group. The WUAs could then become more 'all 
inclusive' institutions which could provide input to watershed management. They 
would provide more accessible channels through which any community concerns can 
be voiced as well as through which education and conservation principles can be 
directed. 
6.3 Participation, capacity and education 
The capacity of the WUAs to perform critical functions as well as the community's 
capacity to understand and implement the functions and rules of the WUA, is a critical 
issue. The question of 'why is capacity falling short and how can this be improved' is 
at the centre of this discussion. The answer is closely linked to the level of 
participation of users in these deliberations and their involvement in education and 
awareness raising programmes and initiatives. 
As emphasised in earlier sections of this study, a key component to successful 
collective action lies in the simplicity and source of the rules. Currently, the 
communities do not understand the purpose of the WUA and the rules are too 
complex to understand, largely because they have been developed by the state. There 
are a few implications that result. Firstly, the community does not feel that they own 
the process and are therefore less likely to co-operate. They need to participate in 
designing the rules so that they are understood from the users' perspective. Secondly, 
complex rules that cannot be understood manifest mistrust and suspicion which are 
already issues in ex-homeland rural areas. This lack of trust undermines collective 
action because their lack of understanding makes them sceptical and therefore often 
become unwilling to co-operate. The involvement of traditional authorities could help 
incorporate appropriate traditional and customary rules which users already 
understand. Rules need to be made to match the educational level and way of 
thinking of local communities so that trust and reciprocity are achieved. 
The criteria for success suggest that more knowledge of the resource results in more 
understanding over its use. Generally, the villagers do not understand the more 
technical and scientific aspects of the water cycle and therefore cannot fully 
understand how their activities impact on the water cycle and the sustainability of 
water. Water in these rural areas is a scarce resource upon which they have a high 
dependency for survival. Given this situation, users will generally be willing to 
participate in collective action towards its sustainability to ensure their own survival. 
However, it is important that the basic scientific concepts of the water cycle are 
understood by the users. This will help users understand how their day to day 
activities may impact on the water cycle in the short and long term, and how to avoid 
or minimise these impacts. Hopefully the benefits that accrue to them in participating 
in conservation efforts will also be recognised. 
Another key challenge that WUAs need to overcome is the issue of illegal use and the 
need to increase incentives to encourage people to become part of the WUA. Illegal 
use could seriously undermine an individual's or communities drive to become part of 
the WUA. A farmer who is accessing water illegally is subtracting from the benefits 
that a licensed water user has by being part of the WUA. Instead of being on the 
WUA and paying for water you could be accessing it for free. If this "free riding" is 
widespread it could lead to resource abuse and degradation. So far, illegal use has not 
been addressed because WUAs do not have the capacity for intense monitoring and 
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enforcement. The research suggests that 'official' monitors from the community be 
appointed, because relying on general water users to make reports is asking them to 
incur both social and monetary costs. The rules that these monitors enforce should be 
simple and widely understood. Violations should have social sanctions and where 
necessary have the support of local authorities. However for monitors to take their job 
seriously incentives of social status or other benefits must exist. The local Water 
Board could increase the capacity of the WUAs to fulfil this monitoring function by 
pinpointing certain areas where water is unaccounted for. By ensuring illegal use will 
not be tolerated farn1ers are more likely to join the WUA to access water legally. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The two case studies investigated revealed important insights about the conditions in 
which WUAs and local level rural institutions in general operate. The rural 
communities largely depend on subsistence and small scale commercial farming for 
survival. The working class and educated generally live in built up areas leaving rural 
areas mostly populated with the younger and older generations. Basic services are and 
education are lacking. The need for government help is evident yet the state often 
lacks the financial and human resources required to assist in developing sustainable 
local institutions. 
When compared to Shackleton's criteria for successful local level management, the 
two WUAs do not currently fit very well into an environment that favours successful 
establishment and operation of local level institutions. However, a few conditions 
present in the WUAs suggest that the potential exists for successful local level 
institutions to be developed. A key focus will need to be on addressing the obstacles 
to successful local collective action and facilitating these changes over time. 
The process of establishing fully functional and successful WUAs face many 
challenges. These include overcoming the complexity, rigidity, and lack of 
community ownership of the rules and regulations through increased stakeholder 
engagement. The lack of capacity of the WUA to perform functions of monitoring and 
conservation management also needs to be addressed to encourage users to see the 
benefits of joining the WUA. Facilitation during the establishment of the WUAs in 
rural areas is extremely important and time consuming. If the state does not have the 
expertise, experience and resources to perform this function effectively, then they 
should look to outsourcing this activity. 
The process of establishing these two WUAs was characterised by a top-down state 
dominated approach which creates an unlikely environment in which local level 
institutions, such as a WUA, can become sustainable. Successful local level 
institutions require the participation and involvement of all resource users and other 
key stakeholders in the design, establishment, and operation of the WUA. A key 
factor in determining the future success of these WU As will be whether government 
decides to continue with a product driven inflexible state dominated approach or 
whether they can move towards a more inclusive process driven approach. 
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